Introduction: Key Debates

Four general debates are summarized here. They are addressed in greater detail and with some variation in each sub-section of the democracy and governance thematic area:

The limits of normative approaches

A central debate in democracy and governance is the normative nature of approaches that have become the basis of most peacebuilding efforts conducted for the last two decades. A frequent critique is the biased lens used to frame overarching issues of democracy and governance, but also more specific sub-topics such as constitutions and civil society.

Normative perspectives on democracy

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet communism have been decisive in the promotion of the liberal peace model, in particular at the United Nations (UN), with a specific emphasis on free and fair elections. This vision of democracy has resulted in a general conflation of democratization/democratic transitioning in post-conflict environments with electoral processes.1 The "by default" definition of democracy used by the international community focuses on procedures, central to which is the holding of "free and fair" elections, rather than on the substance of the democratic project. Some critics have shown the limits of this highly technical approach. It is argued that such methods forget the political dimensions and accompanying conditions that support each step of an electoral process. Beatrice Pouligny notes, "Such a questioning echoes the traditional debate on democracy as an institutional arrangement or as a project for a society."2

Normative perspectives on governance

In many policy papers and concept notes released by bilateral and multilateral actors, the concept of governance has normative values attached. More often than not, this notion actually refers to "good" governance. In its most objective form, the quality of governance may be "measured in terms of how well the various actors handle the rules that make up the basic dimensions of the political regime."3 However, many of the criteria for assessing governance are subjective, making it difficult to clearly delineate and understand "good" and "bad" practices.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) premises its characteristics of fragile states on such a prescriptive framework, observing that "fragile states exhibit a mix of institutional and policy implementation weaknesses. They tend to under-perform across all the dimensions of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index (economic management, structural policies, and social policies, with particular shortcomings in the quality of public sector institutions)."4 Thus, the notions used to measure quality of governance are the same as those indicating state strength, a concept that may actually be misleading, as state strength may not always be an appropriate proxy for good governance (for instance, it has been argued that a strong state may exist in a rather authoritarian and opaque society, which is not representative of "good" governance). The use of the notion of "good governance" by the World Bank and the IMF is often associated by its critics with the ideas of "liberal democracy" and "market economy," an orientation that some consider ultimately to have been detrimental to peacebuilding in a number of countries.
Go to Terminology around democracy: Democracy and its relationship to the economy and civil society

Even when roughly following these criteria, bilateral donors often tend to propose their own definition and qualifying characteristics, which may introduce additional normative concepts, such as participation and deliberation, as central features of governance. For instance, research undertaken by the United Kingdom Improvement and Development Agency for local government (IDEA) suggests that "governance is the sphere of public debate, partnership, interaction, dialogue and conflict entered into by local citizens and organisations and by local government."5 This tenet is seen as widely acceptable. Yet, in certain circumstances, or where used inappropriately, an overreliance on participation may inflame cleavages. As with the "market economy," the measure of "good" adheres not to objective or context-based rules that regulate the public realm but rather to externally determined criteria for assessment.

As some critics, such as Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease, have noticed, "The common denominator for all these agencies is the idea that 'good' governance is a reflection of what works in Western democracies. This normative or ethnocentric tendency is very much apparent in the recipes that the agencies provide to developing countries. So called best practices include multi-party politics, competitive market economies, decentralization, a lean public service, and several other such ideas that are currently mainstream in Western countries and dispensed with through various institutional mechanisms in the international community. Their use of governance, therefore, is open-ended in its scope of coverage, yet normatively confined in orientation. It makes no real distinction between governance and other concepts such as policymaking or policy implementation."6 In other words, the notion of governance "remains a much more rhetorical notion than one that can be used to truly assess and measure variations in governance."7

Normative perspectives on participation

Development anthropology literature has criticized the discourse about, and practice of, participation, showing that it may considerably underestimate the influence of a number of fundamental factors. Particularly in terms of the structure of power, such underestimation may lead to ambiguous if not contrary results.8 Some studies have shown how participatory government can result in unjust and illegitimate exercise of power, stressing the gulf between the fashionable rhetoric of participation, which promises empowerment and appropriate development, and the actual results of promoting and practicing participatory development.9

In the context of public administration reform and local governance, a number of questions have been raised in debates about participation and local participative structures in a variety of countries. These include: the need for continuity and for processes to be institutionalized; the frequently high financial costs of consultation and participation; whether the complexity of some issues is compatible with participation in the decision-making process; the size of the group to involve in decision making (a large group of people, which might result in relatively superficial opinions, or a small group so as to obtain more developed opinions); and the prospect of creating new elites when participatory processes are captured by minority groups or the well mobilized at the expense of marginalized groups.10 This last point echoes traditional questions about the extent to which civil society is actually representative.

Last but not least, practitioners also debate whether an emphasis on participation is fundamentally beneficial, or if, in some circumstances, it can in fact exacerbate conflict and corruption. Consequently, from both a theoretical and practical perspective, the notion of participatory processes demands more empirical analysis and more contextualized approaches.  Go to Civil Society; Constitutions: Participation

Normative values in constitutional processes

In constitutional processes, a significant debate concerning the designation of rights is whether there are certain inalienable rights that should be considered common to all constitutions. Many would contend that certain fundamental rights, usually referring to the right to life and the inviolability of the person, should be incontrovertible. Other basic rights are also thought to be absolute, as they are requisite for human dignity.

While this set of rights as a cross-cultural premise may seem obvious, when placed in context, debates emerge between those who view such rights as universal and those who see some rights as subject to change depending on variations in culture. A fairly recent debate to emerge around the discourse on human rights is whether economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights should be included in constitutions. For example, some newer and more comprehensive constitutions include provisions on education, employment, and health (see, for example, South Africas bill of rights, which provides for property, housing, healthcare, education, etc.).11 Some contest the inclusion of these rights in such a framework, observing that constitutions instead determine the principles around which norms and policies are formed through law.

Normative perspectives on civil society

Some of the confusion around the notion of civil society is linked to the historical evolution of this notion in the West. Indeed, civil society is an almost purely western concept, fashioned by evolutions in that historical tradition, which is concerned mostly with this sectors relationship to the state, economy, and even family. Other notions of civil society that might have existed in other regions (in particular in the global South) or at different times are hardly reflected in the international debate on civil society. As a consequence, most contemporary discourses on civil society tend to leave out the historical variety of the notion, its cultural specificities, and its evolution. This has concrete consequences for donors and practitioners alike.

First, the range of organizational modalities considered as forms of civil society tends to be narrow. In particular, when working in non-western contexts, donors may seek out structures that correspond to the form that civil society has taken in industrialized western societies, forgetting that even within those contexts, civil society has varied according to local political cultures and historical evolutions.

Second, depending on their knowledge and understanding of local history, outsiders may implicitly convey an excessively rigid dichotomy between society and state. Even stricter may be perspectives on what groups and activities are included or excluded in the political sphere, as well as on the nature of the interaction between local governments and these societies. When supporting civil society over the state, policy makers and practitioners may once again forget the diversity of local contexts and historical trajectories, as well as the numerous evolutions that have shaped the local relationship between society and the state. This can even lead to support for illegitimate or insufficiently representative forms of civil society.

The western history of civil society and the lack of integration of other socio-political cultures into the concept explain why there is a persistent debate about the appropriateness of applying the very notion of civil society to non-western contexts.12 In practice, the use of the term civil society may often be more normative than analytic"an indication of a political agenda rather than an actual descriptive category.

These different conceptual ambiguities are at the origin of most of the debates surrounding policies and programs related to civil society in peacebuilding, as well as implementation challenges that arise from such activities.

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Debating the liberal peace model

Whether the liberal peace model is the most appropriate one for consolidating a post-conflict state is a centrally contentious topic in the peacebuilding field today. While the validity of democracy as a sustainably peaceful system is not rejected outright, several aspects of the liberal model and its premises are being contested. One central presumption underlying the liberal peace model is that democracies are more peaceful both domestically and internationally. From a "civil wars" point of view, claims have been made that within states, democratic institutions and processes channel competing interests and provide means of compromise through legitimate mechanisms. In addition, they are seen to provide better guarantees that governments will not abuse their power and to provide the basis for a lasting social contract.13 Further, through an internationalist lens, the liberal peace theory holds that democracies are the best choice for an international order because democracies supposedly do not go to war with one another. Yet, some consider this a particularly limited approach. Its potential to apply to all situations is also contested.14

Is democracy best suited to consolidating peace in post-conflict societies?

The assumption that because "western" consolidated democracies are internally and externally peaceful, democratization will make a state more peaceful is thought by many scholars to reflect a lack of historical perspective and a failure to understand that democratization may produce varying degrees of democracy. This perspective emphasizes that the process of democratic consolidation in western societies is often cited as having been in itself a violent transition. For example, the consolidation of the nation-state in France and America followed violent processes. This is true of most "advanced" democracies, which in their own histories have experienced very violent processes on the road to entrenching democracy, both domestically, through coercion and capital exploitation,15 and internationally, by fighting wars.

The transitional phase of democratization is more particularly highlighted as the most delicate. During that phase, "statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that . . . countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and [that] they do fight wars with democratic states."16 States at the beginning stages of democratization would be the most at risk, especially "newly democratizing countries that lack a strong centralized state to lay down firm rules for regulating popular participation in politics and for enforcing state authority."17

With regard to post-conflict societies, an increasing number of scholars have argued that democracy may actually undermine the consolidation of peace, noting the potentially violent nature of democratic transition. Some critics have noted in particular that ethno-national self-determination can catalyze calls for secession based on ethnic notions of citizenship, which may encourage or intensify violent conflict and result in the defining of citizenship in new states on homogenous terms, countering the rights of people to suffrage and discouraging plural citizenship.18 Problems of this sort have occurred in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, and the former Yugoslavia. Some authors have also pointed to the risk of conflicts fueled by nationalism: Popular nationalism typically arises during the earliest stages of democratization, when elites use nationalist appeals to compete for popular support.19

In addition, ill-timed pressure to democratize where it is unlikely that parties will adhere to the protocols set out may undermine the very institutions democracy attempts to bolster and incur violent outcomes. In Rwanda, the democratization process is often cited as having put too much pressure on extreme groups to democratize. These parties were discontented with the transition and thus turned to ethnicity-based violence.20 Indeed, "transitions to democracy can be treacherous processes," coming with the risk of putting too much pressure on state and political elites and encouraging violence not only within the society but also outside of borders of the state.21

In such scenarios, according to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics. It brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage. Political leaders, finding no way to reconcile incompatible interests, resort to shortsighted bargains or reckless gambles in order to maintain their governing coalitions."22

Some even wonder whether it is better to enforce democracy where it may be ill-timed and ill-placed to deal with some of the challenges of post-conflict environments, or whether a more authoritarian state might be better suited to such situations. In certain circumstances, what some have called a "quick and dirty approach," pushing the organization of elections at all costs, has yielded resurgent war, as in Angola and Liberia.23 The main outcome of such debates is that movements toward democratic transitions should not be uniformly promoted, but rather tailored to the realities of the local situation and to each states capacity at the particular post-conflict juncture.24

Are democracies really more peaceful internationally?

A fair number of scholars contest the argument that democracies are more peaceful. They argue that many of the "advanced" democracies have been instrumental in violence and wars abroad (recently in Iraq and Afghanistan) and have historically undermined democratically elected leaders, in particular during the Cold War, in much of Latin and South America, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The democratic peace argument is still the subject of open debate among political scientists and historians.25

Is the model truly universal? Global versus local models and strategies

Critics note that the liberal peace model is embedded in a particular western paradigm. It has been described by some as the new "mission civilisatrice."26 Indeed, in an attempt at socio-political engineering, western actors have often sought to recreate their own political and economic systems in post-conflict societies.

Critical perspectives are particularly evident in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.27 For instance, some, like Krishna Kumar, would question the "concepts, strategies, techniques, methodologies and prescriptions of international-assistance programmes [that] are primarily derived from the experience of mass-based, secular political parties. Such parties have evolved in western democracies that are characterized by high levels of urbanism, literacy, political consciousness and economic prosperity. However, the socio-economic conditions and cultural traditions of most transition societies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, are different from those in western democracies. Their political parties are organized differently and function differently. Consequently, much assistance by international organizations tends to be of limited relevance to the parties in these countries."28 As such, existing indigenous political and social structures may be more able to support effective democratization processes.29

The roles of international actors in aspects of democratic peacebuilding

In all aspects of the democratization agenda, there is strong criticism of international actors roles. The international community often has aims that differ from those of the local population, including a quick process of stabilization and the imposition of methods according to an external agenda and series of prescriptions.30

In constitution building, the United Nations (UN), in particular, has increasingly taken on the responsibility for collaborating with domestic elites in designing constitutional structures.31 This is particularly the case when the UN is to act as a transitional authority. Common criticisms also concern the fact that the process is generally compressed into an inappropriately short time span and dependent upon a quick exit strategy, which limit deliberation in the constitution-building process, entrench polarized elites in power, and undermine national ownership.32 Situations as varied as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Afghanistan have illustrated the risks of internationalism. While they have a role to play, it is vital that the wishes of international bodies (such as rapid stabilization and a "one-size-fits-all" constitutional model) do not overrule those of local actors and interests.   Go to Constitutions: Key Debates: The benefits and risks of internationalism

On civil society, there is now a general consensus among donors that national actors should take the lead in peacebuilding and that outside intervention should be limited to supporting national actors. However, most donors continue to channel support to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or through INGOs to national, mainly urban, elite-based NGOs.33 Support to civil society peacebuilding through NGO intermediaries has strengths and weaknesses. According to the World Bank, "Interactions with intermediaries are relatively easy to handle logistically and easier to monitor. . . . At the same time, intermediaries are easily driven by donor agendas at the expense of effective empowerment and local ownership, while I-NGOs can crowd out domestic actors."34 Dependency on international funding and frequently criticized donor-driven reporting not only reinforce local CSOs lack of accountability but also influence the orientation of the peacebuilding agenda and programs. Go to Civil Society: Key Debates and Implementation Challenges

Media development activities also bring up tensions between international and national media outlets. In particular, reliance on international media actors in the short term may "crowd out" local media or make domestic outlets dependent on international agents. There are significant and important drawbacks to prioritizing support for international media outlets. By its very definition, local media "tends to be more attuned to the subtleties of local politics" and, on this basis, "can play a critical role in placing pressure upon combatants by exposing human rights atrocities and in defending marginalised or threatened groups."35 Conversely, international media sources, divorced from local nuances, may push an agenda based on external normative value systems that do not reflect best methods for peacebuilding in a localized sense.36 Finally, support to international agencies over domestic ones may reduce local media sustainability, as international agencies compete with indigenous media outlets for funding and reduce the latters space to flourish. Thus, "care should be taken not to turn international broadcasting into a long-term remedy that supplants or crowds out fledgling local independent media."37
Go to International versus national and community media

Democracy without a functioning state

The liberal peace model is also critiqued because it tends to take the existence of functioning states as a given. The model merely asks what is the most desirable political and economic system for the state, rather than asking whether the state itself is irreparable.38 Yet, "war-shattered states typically lack even the most rudimentary governmental institutions. By taking the existence of a working government for granted, many authors have effectively 'assumed away' one of the most difficult and important problems that peacebuilders confront in their field operations: namely, how to establish functional governments and stable nonviolent politics in conditions of virtual anarchy."39

In many post-conflict situations, the challenge may be to actually create rather than reform or even reconstruct local structures. In other cases, institutions have to be created anew, not just adapted, and old institutions must be deconstructed to gain a populations faith in the institutions and lend them legitimacy. The question of whether to construct anew, to reconstruct, or to reform is of central concern in post-conflict environments. It demonstrates the limits of the liberal peace model, which does not anticipate the difficulties of building a state apparatus and new institutions almost from scratch. Go to Challenges: Issues of reform and reconstruction

Given these circumstances, it may seem easier to reconstruct civil society as an alternative to the state, at least during an interim period. Civil society may be perceived as having been more resistant to war than the state, in particular at the community level. However, the situation is rarely that straightforward. As some scholars have noticed, "civil society is neither inherently 'strong' nor 'weak,' but will fall somewhere in between, often being strong in some respects, while weak in others."40 Here again, the fragility of the state has an important impact on the capacity to (re)build civil society. Where there is little trust, stability for incentive structures, or capacity for regulation, actors are faced with limited means of fostering collective action.

The capacity of civil society organizations may also be impaired by the poor quality of physical infrastructure in the country, as well as the weakness of the state apparatus and the institutions with which civil society has to interact, at least minimally, in order to function. In such contexts, the notion "that civil society groups might play useful roles as tools for rebuilding failed states, confuses correlation with causation. A vibrant civil society must be viewed as an indicator of a well-functioning state and society, not as a source."41 To that end, such stakeholders are wary of seeing one arena, such as civil society, as a possible solution without also fostering a range of other institutions, in particular at the level of the state. 
Go to Challenges: The challenges of (re)building civil society after conflict

Similar observations apply to the media. Weak state capacity has important consequences in terms of infrastructure. Given possibly weakened state capacity in these environments, questions are raised as to which actor should implement the infrastructure needed for media to operate. Often, international donors or the private sector may have the most capacity to provide the equipment. However, there is concern that this may prioritize access only for those who can afford it and not in all areas of the country, exacerbating inequalities.42 This is particularly problematic where the private sector is tasked with such undertakings. These inequalities present concern; in already tense environments, they may contribute to reactivating conflict dynamics. Go to Challenges: The impact of conflict on the media sector

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Timing and sequencing versus gradualism of democratization

In various aspects of democracy and governance issues, problems of sequencing and timing interventions often emerge as main points of debate and areas of concern for stakeholders wishing to preserve peace.

An area where this is perhaps most glaringly clear is in the case of elections. Tensions between the need to organize elections and pursue political reforms on the one hand and security issues on the other are the object of constant discussion. It has been repeatedly stressed that ill-timed, hurried, badly designed, or poorly run elections can actually undermine the very process they seek to support in fragile post-conflict environments.43 However, international, as well as national, imperatives may explain the frequent urge to organize elections. Elections are supposed to provide support and legitimacy to governance mechanisms. Interim authorities generally lack at least formal democratic legitimacy.44 Therefore, it may be preferable not to prolong the interim period. It is further argued that a mature democratic culture will take time to be built in any case and requires "a process of trial and error."45

In order to avoid the need for postponement and to ensure the best timing of elections, most analysts recommend assessing whether elections are part of a holistic package of democratization reforms meant to transform the pre- or post-conflict environment.46 They also recognize the need to create conducive conditions for the holding of credible elections and for the stability of the election outcome. Sufficient time is generally required not only to meet the technical requirements but also to establish minimum political, security, and legal conditions. According to the UN, "When these conditions are met, there is a greater likelihood that the outcome of elections will be more credible and stable."47
Go to Electoral Processes and Political Parties: Key Debates and Implementation Challenges

The issue of sequencing also comes into play when balancing elections and constitution building. Here, the question emerges as to how a constitution can "be engineered to reflect and encourage democratic principles when a representative legal body (such as an elected legislature) does not exist to draft it."48 The first option is to start by organizing elections to constitute a constitutional assembly or by first putting in place a constitution before such a body can be elected. Both options present challenges. There is the risk that early elections may increase division and entrench the warring parties as the dominant political players, which could lead to a constitutional assembly that lacks legitimacy.49 "On the other hand, if the process goes on without elections, the interim executive can exercise influence on, or even control, the direction of the constitution-making process. Often this problem is solved by requiring elections to a legislative or constituent assembly and giving it the mandate to draft and adopt the constitution," argue scholars Yash Ghai and Guido Galli.50 New elections may then be organized to elect representatives for a longer term.

Both the decision when to organize elections and the decision how to proceed with the building of a new constitution raise the question of sequencing, a notion that introduces preconditions to democratic processes and is debated but rarely followed in practice. Some have argued that "the idea of sequencing is problematic, as are the policy recommendations that flow from it. A more useful alternative for taking into account the many complications and risks of democratization and democracy promotion is gradualism, which aims at building democracy slowly in certain contexts, but not avoiding it or putting it off indefinitely."51 The notion of preconditions for democratization has been thought to create considerable confusion among both practitioners and analysts. Some have preferred to think of the progression in terms of gradualism.52 Go to Constitutions: Key Debates and Implementation Challenges

Other components of the democracy and governance agenda face the same challenges. For instance, supporting media programs entails balancing the need for rapid response to a crisis against the potentials of implementing unsustainable systems. Exit strategies for international actors that host media outlets, such as radio stations, must be sure to facilitate a transition process.

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Debating democratic consolidation and challenges of sustainable governance

Uncertainties around democratic consolidation

The distinction between the ideal of democracy and the reality is one that often emerges when discussing the extent to which democracy has been consolidated. Many use the "only game in town" theory as a litmus test for democratic consolidation, wherein "no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the state."53 Others utilize the "two turnover" rule, wherein power has successfully changed hands twice via a free and fair electoral process.54 Many experts are less ambitious, particularly in post-war environments, considering that at least three national elections should be held for democracy to be considered to have taken root. Another criterion is the peaceful transfer of power from one political party or coalition to the former opposition.55 Still others measure the degree to which a country has achieved the institutional and legal characteristics of a mature democracy by using indicators such as competitive politics, regular elections, broad participation, constraints on arbitrary use of executive power, free speech, and respect of civil liberties, including those of minorities.56

Generally speaking, there is no broad agreement among political scientists about the criteria to use in determining whether a country has been democratized, nor is there a general theory that explains "why and how the new polyarchies that have institutionalized elections will 'complete' their institutional set, or otherwise become 'consolidated'."57 Scholar Guillermo O'Donnell emphasizes the fact that there is not, and there will never be, a clear-cut and theoretically grounded dividing line that can tell us once and for all when a democratic regime has been consolidated.58 Go to Terminology around democracy: Democracy versus polyarchy

A plethora of indicators measuring democracy and good governance

Although democratization implies a process, it is clearly one that is not necessarily linear, as regimes can progress toward liberalism or regress in their democratic qualities. On this basis, a number of agencies, from international financial institutions (such as the World Bank) to international organizations (such as UNDP), non-governmental organizations (like Freedom House and International IDEA), publications (for instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit), and specialized research centers (for example, Afrobarometer), have put forth measures of democracy and good governance to appraise this very issue of where a democracy lies in its democratization process.59

These measures are typically fraught with the same challenges associated with attempts to delimit democratic consolidation. The complexity of indicators now involved in this realm particularly complicates the issue, given the plethora of tools and their variation across agencies.60

Tensions between short-term commitments and long-term sustainability

There is a broad support base among political scientists for extending the conception of democratic consolidation to encompass a long-term perspective on democratic processes. This may be problematic in post-conflict situations, in particular in the first stages of the peacebuilding process, "as outside actors typically face strong pressures to address short-term needs, but doing so may run counter to the long-term requirements for establishing effective, legitimate state institutions. Preserving a ceasefire and managing potential 'spoilers,' for example, often involves making explicit or tacit bargains with ruling elites whose continued power (whether this power is formally recognized or informally exercised) can get in the way of building 'depersonalized' state institutions and broadening political representation beyond the parties that fought the preceding war."61 It is also well known that one of the challenges of peace agreements is that they tend to "freeze a moment in history, particularly a moment distorted by the fears and insecurities of war."62

Despite these challenges in the peacebuilding context, it is widely considered important that support to electoral and political party systems integrate a longer-term perspective, anticipating the issues of the future and helping political actors to devise means of coping with challenges that may arise. Along the same line, questions have been raised about the sustainability of financial assistance to political parties in post-conflict settings and of electoral systems. It is also not seen as particularly useful to implement technologies where there is little capacity to maintain them after the first election. For instance, ensuring that voter registration lists are maintained and updated is particularly important. If there is little local ability to utilize the technology, it may not be best suited to the situation.
Go to Challenges: Building sustainable political parties and electoral systems

On the different dimensions of the democracy and governance agenda, more attention is now placed on local ownership and capacity building as important factors "for successful elections, and even more critical for a continuous democratization process."63 But, as practitioners stress, "capacity building is a means to an end in the long development process. In fact, it is part of a long development process. It should, by definition, be integrated as fully as possible in national development policies, plans and strategies."64 This supposes, however, that long-term perspectives and priorities are integrated from the outset by everybody. This is difficult to achieve when security remains a strong concern, as may be the case in post-conflict environments.65

1. Pouligny, "Promoting Democratic Institutions," 17-18.
2. Pouligny, "The Limits of Imposed Procedural Democracy in Post-War Societies," in Peace Operations Seen from Below, 239. On the importance of both political and technical dimensions of democratic reform, see, Andrew Ellis, "Elections Are Not an Island: The Process of Negotiating and Designing Post-Conflict Electoral Institutions" (paper presented at the conference, Post-Conflict Elections in West Africa: Challenges for Democracy and Reconstruction,Accra, Ghana, May 15-17, 2006).
3. Hyden, Court, and Mease, Making Sense of Governance, 5.
4. International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Funds Engagement in Fragile States and Post-Conflict Countries"A Review of Experience"Issues and Options (Washington, DC: IMF, 2008), 8.
5. United Kingdom Improvement and Development Agency for local government (IDEA), "Definitions of Sustainable Governance: Governance."
6. Hyden, Court, and Mease, Making Sense of Governance, 2.
7. Ibid., 1.
8. See, for instance, Wendy James, "Empowering Ambiguities," in The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures, ed. Angela Cheater (New York: Routledge, 1999); David Mosse, "People's Knowledge," in Project Planning: The Limits and Social Conditions of Participation in Planning Agricultural Development (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1995); Nour-Eddine Sellamna, Relativism in Agricultural Research and Development: Is Participation a Post-Modern Concept? (London: Overseas Development Institute,1999); Sarah C. White, "Depoliticising Development: The Uses and Abuses of Participation," Development in Practice 6, no. 1 (1996): 6-15.
9. Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, eds., Participation: The New Tyranny? (London: Zed Books, 2001).
10. Hsu and Wang, "The Institutional Design," 337.
11. South African Government Information, "Chapter 2: Bill of Rights," South African Constitution (1996).
12. Paffenholz and Spurk, Civil Society, Civil Engagement, and Peacebuilding, 3.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Roland Paris, At Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8.
15. See, for instance, Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," American Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (1981): 901-10; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1990).
16. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995) 79.
17. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 29.
18. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War.
19. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 32.
20. Peter Uvin, "Rwanda: The Social Roots of Genocide," in War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
21. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 334.
22. Mansfield and Snyder, Democratization and War, 88.
23. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 2-3.
24. Ibid.
25. See, for instance, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). For a summary of the theory of democratic peace, see, Steve Chan, "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," Mershon International Studies Review 41 (1997): 59-92. A good account of the debate surrounding these questions may be found in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For a critique of this argument, refer to Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: "The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 5-49.
26. Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'," 641.
27. See, in particular, Sabine Kurtenbach, "Why Is Liberal Peace-Building So Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America," GIGA Research Unit Institute of Latin American Studies Paper No. 59 (2007); Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, The International Post/Conflict Industry: Myths, Market Imperfections and the Need for a New Reconstruction Paradigm (Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2003).
28. Kumar, "Reflections on International Political Party Assistance," 522.
29. See, Pouligny, "Promoting Democratic Institutions," 17-35. See also, UNGA, Support by the United Nations, sec. 19.
30. Roberto Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (London: Routledge, 2007), 7.
31. Naazneen Barma, "Brokered Democracy-Building: Developing Democracy through Transitional Governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan," International Journal on Multicultural Societies 8, no. 2 (2006): 127-28.
32. Ibid., 129; Michele Brandt, Constitutional Assistance in Post-Conflict Countries: The UN Experience: Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2005), 7.
33. World Bank Social Development Department, Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 25; Paffenholz and Spurk, Civil Society, Civil Engagement, and Peacebuilding, 25.
34. Ibid., 11.
35. Ibid., 18.
36. Allen and Stremlau, Media Policy, Peace and State Reconstruction.
37. Kalathil, Langlois, and Kaplan, Towards a New Model, 51.
38. Ibid., 46-47.
39. Ibid.
40. Kristian Berg Harpviken and Kjell Erling Kjellman, Beyond Blueprints: Civil Society and Peacebuilding  (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2004), 6.
41. Ibid., 252.
42. Ibid., 56.
43. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Electoral Systems and Processes," in Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (New York: UNDP, 2004), 29.
44. Jarrett Blanc, Aanund Dylland, and Kåre Vollan, State Structures and Electoral Systems in Post-Conflict Situations (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2006), 11.
45. Ibid.
46. Snyder, From Voting to Violence,320.
47. United Nations Peacemaker, Operational Guidance Note: Setting the Date of Elections (New York: United Nations), 1-2.
48. UNDP, Constitution and Its Relationship to the Legislature.
49. Kirsti Samuels, "Constitutional Choices and Statebuilding in Postconflict Countries," in The Dilemmas of  Statebuilding:  Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (New York: Routledge, 2008).
50. Ghai and Galli, Constitution Building Processes, 10.
51. Thomas Carothers, "How Democracies Emerge: The Sequencing Fallacy," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 14.
52. Ibid., 24.
53. Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidating Democracies," 15.
54. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 27.
55. Hauss, "Democratization."
56. Snyder, From Voting to Violence,27. See also, Staffan I. Lindberg, Opposition Parties and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, no. 1 (2006): 132.
57. ODonnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," 39.
58. Guillermo ODonnell, "The Perpetual Crises of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 7. 
59. Ibid., 2.  For a particularly useful listing of democratic governance measures, as well as a description of each project, see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Oslo Governance Centre, Sources for Democratic Governance Indicators (Oslo: United Nations, 2004).
60. Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" 92.
61. Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions, 4-5.
62. Terrence Lyons, "Postconflict Elections: War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarizing Politics," Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper No. 20 (2002), 17.
63. UNGA, "Support by the United Nations," 6.
64. Leon Badibanga, comment on Theme 2: "Supporting Sustainable Good Governance Capacities in Post-Conflict Transitions," in e-discussion in Supporting State and Governance Capacities in Post-Conflict Transitions, CPRP-net, Capacity-net, DGP-net, and PBCOP (July-August 2008). [page?]
65. Pablo Ruiz, comment on Theme 2: "Supporting Sustainable Good Governance Capacities in Post-Conflict Transitions," in e-discussion in Supporting State and Governance Capacities in Post-Conflict Transitions, CPRP-net, Capacity-net, DGP-net, and PBCOP (July-August 2008), 10.

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