Natural Resources: Key Debates & Implementation Challenges
This section highlights various key debates and challenges that are found within the literature and practice related to natural resources and peacebuilding.
1 They argue that the resource curse can be avoided by countries with "sufficiently good institutions,"2 and highlight the implications for non-agricultural commodity exporting countries with weak institutions, common in Sub-Saharan Africa.3 This position is supported by Johannes Linn in a report for the Brookings Institution who writes that "[i]nstitutional, rather than economic reasons, are to blame for the difficulties that many developing countries have experienced in managing their natural resources effectively."4 Similarly, Michael Ross has argued that, oil and mineral dependent states tend to suffer from unusually high rates of corruption, authoritarian government, government ineffectiveness, military spending, and civil war.5
While these scholars argue that poor governance creates the resource curse, others, such as Terry L. Karl, suggest that high natural resource revenues can have a negative influence on the state. She argues that commodity-led growth can induce changes in prevailing notions of property rights, the relative power of interest groups and organizations, and the role and character of the state vis--vis the market. "These institutional changes subsequently define the revenue basis of the state, especially its tax structure. How these states collect and distribute taxes, in turn, creates incentives that pervasively influence the organization of political and economic life and shapes government preferences with respect to public policies."6 Long-term efficiency in the allocation of resources, then, "is either helped or hindered, and the diverse development trajectories of nations are initiated, modified, or sustained."7 Taken together, these two views present a portrait of an endogenous cycle, or governance trap, wherein natural resource reliance may weaken state accountability to its citizenry and breed corruption, while less accountable, more corrupt states are less able to develop the economy and diversify . On the bright side, however, improvements in governance may start the cycle working in a positive direction.
Ross has further suggested that the reasons for "why resource-exporting governments seem to manage their economies so poorly," fall into three types of explanations:8
Additionally, as Collier has pointed out, much of the economic policy literature is dominated by the economies typical of OECD countries, China and India,10 whereas Africa faces particular challenges: "The management of these unpredictable price spikes raises vital issues of economic policy choices. Although these issues are at the core of managing the typical African economy, they do not arise in the OECD economies, China or India. 11He argues that African policy makers "face a double challenge: coping with events that are intrinsically difficult, and doing so without the normal guidance of learning from the "core economies."12
Thus there is need for policy guidance that would speak to the contextual realities in Africa - particularly given the links of resource abundance with conflict. Some of the smaller developing economies, it has been suggested, now have long experience with the management of commodity shocks, which can form the basis for learning and sharing of experiences.13
[Back to Top] 14 "Greed" refers to violence driven by economic opportunism on the part of rebel factions, whereas "grievance" refers to in-group feelings of ethnic or political marginalization and resulting out-group hostility. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler believe that the former derives from the economics school of thought, the latter from the political science paradigm. Both camps assume distinct rebel motivations and explanations for conflict as being uncharacteristic of usual peacetime norms. In the immediate wake of Collier and Hoeffler's contributions, academic discourse on the subject focused on polarizing debates over the merits of each theory, pitting 'loot-seeking' with 'justice-seeking' motives against one another in the context of broader debates over socio-political versus economic motivations for war.15
Greed and grievanceThe greed theory outlays a rational choice paradigm in which conflict is explained as an absence of cooperation and combatants identify resource rents as financial opportunities for enrichment and operation support. It suggests that rebels may in fact ignite conflict as a means to continue the illegal capturing or resource rents. 16 Moreover, agent preferences are assumed to be based on absolute gains in utility, rather than relative utility differentials between agents or groups.
By contrast, grievance is a behavioral paradigm that tends to reflect deeper social inequalities and divisions, reflecting social (ethnic or religious), economic, or political exclusion. In resource-endowed countries with high poverty levels, grievances may be heightened by inequalities, unemployment, poor resource access, labor migration or other reasons.17 Succinctly stated, it holds, "rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest."18 These grievances can include: economic inequality, a lack of political rights, and ethnic and religious schisms.19
Defending the greed perspectiveIn the early 2000s, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler gained significant prominence in the literature on conflict and peacebuilding for their findings that economic opportunities are a more powerful determinant of rebellion than grievance-related motives.Although Collier and Hoeffler recognize that grievances can account for some rebellions, they conclude from econometric research that, "economic viability appears to be the predominant systematic explanation of rebellion."20 In other words, motive may be a driver of conflict, but it is economic opportunity that leads to actual conflict. They hold that motive alone fails to fully explain the reasons for rebellions to emerge, rather by unique opportunities for capturing profit.21 They hold this scenario as more likely as groups waging conflict are often the same as those benefiting financially from it.22 Specifically, Collier and Hoeffler assert that opportunity for financing rebellions can result from: extortion of natural resources, donations from Diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments.23
Natural resource abundance represents a prime example of fiscal opportunity. State reliance on a single export commodity poses a potent risk factor as they are more often prone to official corruption or extortion by rebel groups.24
In their findings, Collier and Hoeffler based their conclusions on three "proxies" for explaining the rebel motivation towards violence: mean income per capita, male secondary schooling, and the growth rate of the economy.25 However, few rebel groups would acknowledge greed as their motive for warfare, many instead carefully courting international public opinion for sympathetic solidarity and to validate their own propaganda or serve a function to mobilize rebel forces internally.26
Opposition to the greed perspectiveDespite the prominence of the Collier/Hoeffler research in the literature on conflict, peace and natural resources, many scholars and practitioners find fault with their theory of greed as the primary driver of conflict, especially natural resource-related conflicts. Critics insist that wars are never rooted in just one cause, whether the causes are greed-relatedor natural resource-related, conflicts are complex phenomena that most often carry other contributing causes. Clear analytical limits exist to an either/or dichotomy that oversimplifies nuances of intricate social systems.27 These critics contend that the greed debate misses elemental grievances of socio-economic inequality or exclusion or political alienation.28 David Francis argues, "Though greed plays a role in fuelling and prolonging wars in Africa, the relationship is not as simple as Collier claims, and in fact to conclude that greed is the cause of conflict is to miss the key point in conflict analysis, i.e. no single interpretation can explain conflict situations in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter."29 Michael Ross agrees that, "...Natural resources are never the only source of conflict. Any given conflict is brought about by a complex set of events; often poverty, ethnic or religious grievances, and unstable governments also play major roles."30
Some argue that the phenomenon of the natural resource curse can be explained via many conceivable causal mechanisms.31 Humphreys points out that the correlation between a predominance of natural resource commodities in the economy and the onset of conflict may indicate causality running the opposite direction of that most often supposed. That is, it may not suggest that natural resources incent greedy rebels. Rather, war may naturally strip from the economy other industries, leaving only extractive industries behind. Beyond this possibility, Humphreys suggests six rival mechanisms that might help to explain the relationship between natural resources and war onset and duration.32
Go to Economic Recovery: Natural Resources and Peacebuilding - Natural Resources and Peacebuilding Process: Natural Resource Curse
David Keen may be most well known for his criticisms of Collier's greed theory. He holds that grievances cannot be ignored because of the presence of other non-ideological factors. By suggesting that rebel groups would never admit to a greed motive, Collier irrationally presumes economics consistently offers a more valid explanation than the entire fields of politics, sociology and anthropology, and suggests that no amount of rebel engagement, as key stakeholders in the conflict, would be prudent. Second, he upholds that Collier chooses a "rather dubious selection of proxies" which is by design narrow and inconclusive. His third critique a complete abandonment of the power of ruling elites to control political dynamics and rents, as if rebels alone were capable of propelling conflict, without the influence of the state or its forces. Finally, he advocates for the need to deepen understanding of the interaction of greed and grievance factors.33
David Francis also argues that the greed theory is fundamentally flawed by a failure to consider the country's histories before 1965. For example, diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone in the 1930s, but civil war did not occur until the 1990s.34
Critics of the greed perspective recognize that economics are frequently a factor in conflicts, but they counter that there is little understood about the how and why these interactions occur.Clarity on how and how much these factors interact and influence one another could reveal much about corresponding, and ultimately, inherently related political, socio-cultural and anthropological factors.35 Charles Cater offers a different method for understanding the political economy of civil wars and the relationships to natural resource revenues. He argues that causes of conflict should be examined from a broader, less rebel-centric model (as well as natural resource-centric), whereby other economic concepts are considered, including regionalization, privatization, and globalization.36
Finally, economic models of conflict show that when the outputs of production are contestable (i.e., when any value added by any actor can be jointly contested by all actors), then "greed" and "grievance" cease to be meaningful categories. That is, when anyone can fight for a share of the same pie, an increase in one actor's share necessarily implies a decrease in the share of the others. In this way, contestable outputs (and natural resources are a quintessential example) make for a zero-sum game, while uncontestable outputs may allow for mutually beneficial scenarios. 37
Jointly these critiques present a compelling case for further examination of the assortment of dynamic and inter-related factors that cross disciplines in attempt to explain the origins for conflict. These scholars may advise practitioners to take due consideration of the scope of incentives in order to design resource governance assistance strategies aligned with peacebuilding objectives.
Beyond Greed and GrievanceFor the most part, the "greed versus grievance" debate has given way in recent years to a more nuanced academic discussion. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman argue that the dichotomy of "greed versus grievance" is a falsely simplistic one, and does not take into account the political institutions that can structure conflict dynamics.38 Erin McCandless and Tyler Christie argue that there may be a "thin line between the 'greed' and efforts to sustain livelihood when a post-war, survival of the fittest mentality is matched with a dearth of other livelihood options."39 Moreover, while today's resurgent ethno-nationalism may appear at odds with the negligible role that Collier ascribes to the grievance mechanism(s) in initiating and fueling civil violence, the view of violence as solely driven by expected or actual payoffs is not absolutely incompatible with the relevance of ethnic groups. In particular, Caselli and Coleman argue that ethnicity serves to enforce membership in coalitions during insurrections, allowing groups to internalize the payoffs relative to members who actually took the risk of rebellion.40 This argument portrays ethnicity as a preexisting structure that can be harnessed to increase economic payoffs per risk. Ethnic constructivists such as Patterson go so far as to assert that the process of internalizing payoffs actually redraws ethnic groups' boundaries, redefining self-ascriptive identities - a way of more precisely tailoring the group to economic opportunities.41
Many scholars argue that the greed-grievance distinction is difficult to formulate absolutely in relation to natural resources: economic and social phenomena may be linked endogenously. That is, "grievance" mechanisms may influence the effect of "greed" mechanisms and vice versa. For instance, economic opportunities may require collective action that requires ethnic cohesiveness to achieve, while ethnic groups themselves may be shaped over time by economic opportunities.
Take, e.g., Macartan Humphreys' sparse networks theory described above. This theory implies that intergroup social capital, including such constructs as trust, may be built initially upon economic links-links that are never built, or which atrophy, in economies dependent upon resource exportation. This theory may be seen as a descendent of the original "contact hypothesis," which postulated that under defined conditions42, increased contact between two separate groups would lead also to greater mutual empathy, trust, and eventually peaceful interaction.43 Mutually beneficial forms of economic exchange were seen as fulfilling the requirements for the contact hypothesis. This tradition is represented today in the work of Saumitra Jha, who notes that ancient Indian port cities hosted frequent interaction between sea-traders (Muslim) and land-based businessmen (Hindus). He argues that these port cities displayed more peaceful inter-ethnic relations than their non-port counterpart cities long after economic exchange had ceased. If peaceful inter-ethnic relations boost economic growth by expanding the market size, increasing the division of labor, Jha's port cities may represent variable endogeneity complicating the simple greed vs. grievance dichotomy.44
[Back to Top] 45 They argue the distinction is important in labeling states that boast high levels of unearned income as tending to avert the customary regulatory and supervisory role of the economy, but rather focus on developing a capacity as a service provider (education, health, social welfare) often supporting manystate-owned enterprises.46
An additional problem for countries heavily dependent on natural resources is that governments may lack motivation to be accountable to their citizens when there is a low tax base and high revenue from natural resource.47 Observers make the case that financial dependence on natural endowments tend to obviate the necessity to collect taxes as revenue for public service provision.48 In many developing nations awash in oil reserves, oil rents comprise a large majority of profit, but with a detrimental knock-on effect - a weakened civil society with no stake in a political process that demands accountability.49 This relationship between rentier states and taxpayers blocks opportunities for political representation.50 Instead of a healthy public scrutiny, states have generous funds (and poor fiscal oversight) to purchase their political support through patronage and other means.51 Unfortunately, the consequence of this dilemma is a citizenry robbed of public oversight functions in precisely the kind of conditions that require it most. 52
Richard Auty and Philippe Le Billon argue that governments become spoiled by these windfall revenues, a condition which predisposes them to a fixation on short-term capture and doling out of this treasure, rather than on wealth creation, which tends to be a longer-term endeavor riddled with a perceived uncertainty.53 Those in power reaping the rewards of high revenues for their own gain are less inclined to offset these gains for later benefit.54 They make the case that, "Such conditions tend to nurture predatory political systems, in which elites have a strong financial interest in staying in power, even if it is through repressive and authoritarian means."55
Preventing the development of rentier states or transforming them to states where natural resources are well-governed requires a focus on strengthening local revenue mobilization capacity and controlling corruption and rent seeking, in particular through the development of rigorous oversight mechanisms, alongside numerous other strategies for good natural resource management.
Go to Economic Recovery: Natural Resources and Peacebuilding - Implementation Strategies
[Back to Top] 56 Politically stable states demonstrating earnest and proactive economic growth and resource management initiatives can go a long way in addressing these concerns.
Creating legal frameworks endorsing in a licit manner the management of resource revenues serves to shift the balance of power from combatants who may have thrived on illegal trafficking. In transitional states where corruption or bribery may be an appealing alternative to reliable income, legal frameworks offer transparency to deter such practices, in addition to regulated market-based trade often offering higher prices for legal resources.57
Other strategies to develop the right kind of incentives are recommended. Both Global Witness and George Soros recommend making reporting a requirement for companies listing on major stock exchanges - offering the dual benefits of compliance with a global certification system, as well as safeguard confidentiality for privately held firms. Where this may be too dramatic a step early on, one alternative is allowing firms to report confidentially to IFIs, which would act as an interlocutor, compiling the data and then publishing revenues in an aggregate format. This allows firms to retain confidentiality of revenue figures, and better secure competitive advantage, while still complying with international certification standards for transparency.58
The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, around which local civil society organizations, multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the government of Chad forged an alliance, once served as model for cooperative high-risk joint investment.59 However, the World Bank withdrew from the project in September 2008, citing the Government's reneging on its agreement to direct oil revenues to poverty alleviation projects in education, health, infrastructure, rural development and governance reform. The seven-year $65.7 million loan-financed project, one of the largest on-shore infrastructure investments in Africa, is now widely held as one of the most controversial and disastrous projects in recent Bank history.60 The surprising collapse of the project provides a reminder that even the most carefully laid plans for innovative, consultation-based strategies - absent of genuine political commitment to good practices -are subject to debilitating failure.
Courting the right kind of investment and incorporating indigenous resource rights are only two of the myriad challenges confronting conflict-sensitive approaches to resource governance. The strategies discussed in this section offer some guidance in promoting positive incentives and developing effective regulatory frameworks, as well as inducing state capacity to monitor and enforce the licit trade, revenues and expenditures of their own natural resource endowments, but they do not offer a panacea universal set of solutions for every context. Perhaps the most important development in this arena is the growing recognition that natural resources can and should be viewed as a critical asset for post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding. Indeed, for states and their stakeholders blessed with resource abundance, linking natural resource governance policy and practice to a post-conflict recovery strategy may ultimately mean the difference between war and peace.
Go to Economic Recovery: Private Sector
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Indigenous peoples are among the world's most marginalized, impoverished and vulnerable peoples, who depend on natural resources for their livelihood needs. Often however, they inhabit diverse but fragile ecoystems.61 Around the world however, indigenous peoples are often forced to fight for recognition of their right to own, manage and develop their traditional lands, territories and resources."62This is particularly problematic given that their relationship with their traditional lands and territories forms a core part of their identity and spirituality and is usually deeply rooted in their culture and history. In many instances, development has intruded upon the land of indigenous peoples and interrupted their livelihood capacities, and the result is a loss of their lands, and the marginalization, discrimination and underdevelopment of their communities.63
Indigenous communities have managed their environments sustainably for generations, and thus are acutely aware of the relationship between the environmental impacts of various types of development on their lands, and the environmental and subsequent health impacts on their peoples. As stated in a background paper by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, "Through their deep understanding of and connection with the land, indigenous communities have managed their environments sustainably for generations. In turn, the flora, fauna and other resources available on indigenous lands and territories have provided them with their livelihoods and have nurtured their communities."64 And yet, indigenous leaders believe this relationship is increasingly at risk.65
Other issues relate to the fact that many of the world's remaining natural resources lie within indigenous peoples' territories, including minerals, freshwater, potential energy sources, and other resources.66 Indigenous communities are often "expelled from their territories under the pretext of the establishment of protected areas or national parks."67 In many cases this forced displacement of indigenous peoples from their traditional forests is a result of laws that favor the interests of commercial companies.68 Privatization of indigenous lands is increasing, which is a violation of the Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, which says, "Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources."69
Climate change is also a serious issue affecting indigenous peoples. As Christina Nilsson states, "[w]hile indigenous peoples bear the brunt of the catastrophe of climate change, they have minimal access to resources to cope with the changes."70Around the world, climate change brings different kinds of risks and opportunities for indigenous peoples, threatening their cultural survival and undermining their human rights. Ecosystem changes have consequences and implications for the use, protection and management of wildlife, fisheries and forests, all of which affects the customary uses of culturally and economically important species and resources.71
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ongoing advocacyThe Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples isthe result of more than two decades of negotiation between indigenous peoples and governments. The Declaration emphasizes that "indigenous peoples' control over their lands, territories and resources will enable them to 'maintain and strengthen their institutions, culture and traditions' and to 'promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs.'"72
The Declaration states that the General Assembly is "convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations..."73 Further, Article 26 states that:
1. Paul Collier and Benedikt Goderis, "Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum" (Oxford: University of Oxford, Department of Economics, 2007), 3.
4. Johannes F. Linn, "Central Asia's Energy Challenge: Overcoming the Natural Resource Curse," (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, August 22, 2008).
5. Michael L. Ross, "Extractive Sectors and the Poor," (Boston: Oxfam America, October 2001), 4.
6. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 7.
8. Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," World Politics, Volume 51, January 1999: 298.
10. Paul Collier, "Managing Commodity Booms: Lessons of International Experience" (paper prepared for the African Economic Research Consortium, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, January 2007), 1-2.
13. Collier, "Managing Commodity Booms: Lessons of International Experience," 2.
14. Karen Ballentine, "Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Principal Research Findings and Policy Recommendations," (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2004), 3.
15. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict" (New York: International Peace Academy, October 2003), 2.
16. Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 91.
17. Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Erwin H. Bulte, "Natural Resource Abundance and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars," (working paper no. 08/78, Zurich: CER-ETH Center of Economic Research at ETH, January 2008), 1.
18. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (October 21, 2001), 2.
19. Ibid., 1.
21. Ibid., 2.
22. Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," 91.
23. Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 3.
24. Ibid., 1.
25. Ibid., 4.
26. Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,"92.
27. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict," 2.
28. David Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 83.
30. Michael L. Ross, "The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor," in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, eds. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2003), 19.
31. Macartan Humphreys, "Economics and Violent Conflict" (commissioned essay, Harvard University, Cambridge, February 2003), 2.
32. Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 510.
33. David Keen, "Conflict, Trade and Economic Agendas," CCTS Newsletter 19 (London: Committee for Conflict Transformation Support).
34. David Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 83-84.
35. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict," 2.
36. Charles Cater, "The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa," The Political Economy of Armed Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.), 2003.
37. Jack Hirshleifer, "The Paradox of Power," Economics and Politics 3 (1991): 177-200; Raul Caruso, "Butter, Guns and Ice-Cream: Policy Implications of Theoretical Conflict Economics," MIT International Review (February 2009).
38. Karen Balletine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
39. Erin McCandless and Tyler Christie, "Beyond Sanctions: Evolving Integrated Strategies to Address Natural Resource-Based Challenges in Post-Conflict Liberia," Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 2, no. 1 (2006): 31.
40. Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman, "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict," (CEP Discussion Paper No. 732. Centre for Economic Performance, 2006).
41. Orlando Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance," in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) (1975): 305-349.
42. The conditions included: equal status, cooperative activity, personal interaction, and strong institutions such as norms and contract enforcement.
43. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954).
44. Saumitra Jha, "Trade, Institutions and Religious Tolerance: Evidence from India," (manuscript, 2007).
45. Andrew Rosser, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey," (working paper 268, University of Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, April 2006), 15; Aderoju Oyefusi, "Natural Resource Abundance and Development: Is There a Paradigm Shift?" Journal of Business and Public Policy 1, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 4.
46. Rosser, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey," 15.
47. Ibid.; Oyefusi, "Natural Resource Abundance and Development," 4; Humphreys, "Economics and Violent Conflict," 8; Richard Auty and Philippe Le Billon, "Managing Revenues from Natural Resources and Aid," in Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development, ed. Oli Brown, Mark Halle, Sonia Pena Moreno and Sebastian Winkler(Earthscan, 2007), 160.
48. Oyefusi, "Natural Resource Abundance and Development?" 4.
50. Auty and Le Billon, "Managing Revenues from Natural Resources and Aid," 160.
51. RWI, "Our Work/Issues: Revenue Transparency," RWI.
53. Auty and Le Billon, "Managing Revenues from Natural Resources and Aid," 160.
56. Paul Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. (World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003). 182.
57. Philippe Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict (London: Adelphi Paper 373, IISS, 2005), 32.
58. Paul Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 129.
59. Ibid., 130.
61. Christina Nilsson, "Climate Change from an Indigenous Perspective: Key Issues and Challenges," in Indigenous Affairs, eds. Christina Nilsson and Mark Nuttall, 1-2/08 (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), 9.
62. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), "Backgrounder: Indigenous Peoples - Lands, Territories and Natural Resources" (New York: UNPFII), 1.
63. Ibid, 2.
66. Ibid., 3.
69. United Nations (UN), "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," A/RES/61/295, (New York: United Nations, 2008).
70. Christina Nilsson, "Climate Change from an Indigenous Perspective: Key Issues and Challenges," 9.
72. UNPFII, "Backgrounder: Indigenous Peoples - Lands, Territories and Natural Resources," 1.
73. Ibid., 2.
74. UN, "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," 10.